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In this paper we study the proof theory of the ﬁrst constructive version of hybrid logic
called Intuitionistic Hybrid Logic (IHL) in order to prove its decidability. In this perspective
we propose a sequent-style natural deduction system and then the ﬁrst sequent calculus
for this logic. We prove its main properties like soundness, completeness and also the cut-
elimination property. Finally we provide, from our calculus, the ﬁrst decision procedure for
IHL and then prove its decidability.
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1. Introduction
In the standard Kripke semantics for modal logics, a model is a transition system where the same formula may have
different truth values at different worlds [4,9]. The hybrid logics were mainly introduced in order to express this relativity of
truth [2,3] by adding to modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols called nominals, and also a new operator, called
satisfaction operator, that allows one to jump to the world named by a nominal. There exist many works on hybrid logics,
mainly on classical versions, about calculi, decidability and complexity [1,2,6,19].
In this work we aim at studying an intuitionistic version of hybrid logic called IHL and deﬁned by Braüner and
de Paiva [7]. It has been designed from the intuitionistic modal logic IK introduced in [17], knowing that intuitionistic
modal logics have some important applications in computer science, for instance for formal veriﬁcation of computer hard-
ware [11] or deﬁnition of programming languages [10,14]. There exits a natural deduction system for IHL, extended with
additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relation but in this logic the proof theory, through
the sequent calculus formalism, and the decidability have not really been explored. There is also another constructive ver-
sion of hybrid logic [13] that is based on the intuitionistic modal logic IS5 [17] and later enriched with the disjunctive
connective and the constant denoting absurdity [8]. However, this logic cannot be seen as a complete hybridization of IS5
because the nominals (called places in the original paper) are only used with the satisfaction operator. We have recently
studied proof theory for this logic by deﬁning sequent calculi dedicated to proof and countermodel construction [12]. Thus
we have given an alternative proof of decidability by proof-theoretical arguments and shown that the sequent calculus for-
malism is a good formalism allowing an effective management of nominals in the proof-search process. Even if IHL is also
an intuitionistic hybrid logic these results cannot be directly extended for this logic.
In this paper we consider the intuitionistic hybrid logic IHL for which, as said before, there only exists a natural deduction
system [7] and the decidability is still an open question. In order to solve it, we mainly propose a sequent calculus for IHL
that is adapted to proof-search but also to the study of decidability. There are many works on classical versions of hybrid
logics but they cannot be directly adapted in order to propose a sequent calculus allowing to show decidability in such
an intuitionistic version of hybrid logic. A key point is to solve the problem of the introduction of new nominals due to
some rules, that is similar to the introduction of new labels in the labelled sequent calculi of intuitionistic modal logics [17].
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because we can deﬁne proof systems with only invertible rules that lead to terminating proof-search [5,15]. But it is a real
problem for intuitionistic versions and one needs to introduce new appropriate concepts to deal with it.
In this context the main contributions of this work are: the deﬁnition of a sequent calculus for IHL, the proofs of its
soundness and completeness and also of the cut-elimination property, and ﬁnally the ﬁrst proof of its decidability based
on this calculus. From these results we will study in next works the complexity of IHL [1] but also extensions of our
sequent calculus with rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations (geometric theories) like reﬂexiv-
ity, symmetry and transitivity, in order to obtain a modular system in which each condition on the accessibility relation
has a corresponding rule and each combination of these rules is complete for the logic with the corresponding condi-
tions.
Section 2 presents the ﬁrst constructive version hybrid logic IHL [7] and its known related results. In Section 3 we give
a sequent-style natural deduction system for IHL, denoted DNSIHL , in order to deal with validity in IHL. It is derived from
the initial natural deduction system DNIHL [7]. In Section 4 we deﬁne a sequent calculus for IHL, called GIHL , and then
we prove its soundness and completeness. Moreover we prove that our calculus satisﬁes the cut-elimination property and
ﬁnally we show how to derive another sequent calculus for IHL. In Section 5 we prove the decidability of IHL from our
sequent calculus. The key point of the decision procedure is the use of the cut-elimination property in order to provide
a suitable subformula property different from the usual one: the quasi-subformula property. In this context we introduce a
notion of redundancy on cut-free derivations in our calculus such that any sequent that is valid has an irredundant proof.
Then, by using the quasi-subformula property, we prove that there is no inﬁnite proof which is not irredundant and then
we provide a decision procedure for IHL and prove its decidability.
2. Intuitionistic hybrid logic
Hybrid logics are logics obtained by adding to modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols, called nominals, which
are used to refer to speciﬁc worlds in a model and also a new operator called satisfaction operator that allows us to jump to
the worlds named by nominals. For more details about hybrid logics see [3]. In this paper, we focus on the ﬁrst constructive
version of hybrid logic IHL [7].
Let Prop be a countably set of propositional symbols and Nom be a countably set of nominals that is disjoint from Prop.
We use p,q, r, . . . to range over Prop and a,b, c, . . . to range over Nom. Moreover, we use Nom(S) to denote the set of
nominals that appear in the syntactic object S .
The formulas of IHL are given by the following grammar:
A ::= p | a | ⊥ | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | A ⊃ A |A | ♦A | a : A
Deﬁnition 1. An IHL-Kripke model is a tuple(
W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W
)
with
– W is a non-empty set (of ‘worlds’) partially ordered by ;
– for each w ∈ W , Dw is a non-empty set such that if w  w ′ then Dw ⊆ Dw ′ ;
– for each w ∈ W , ∼w is an equivalence relation on Dw such that if w  w ′ then ∼w⊆∼w ′ ;
– for each w ∈ W , Rw is a binary relation on Dw such that if w  w ′ then Rw ⊆ Rw ′ ;
– for each w ∈ W , Vw is a function that assigns to each p ∈ Prop a subset of Dw such that if w  w ′ then Vw(p) ⊆
Vw ′ (p).
Moreover
– if d ∼w d′ , e ∼w e′ and Rw(d, e) then Rw(d′, e′);
– if d ∼w d′ and d ∈ Vw(p) then d′ ∈ Vw(p).
Given an IHL-Kripke model (W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ) and an element w ∈ W , a w-assignment
is a function which assigns to each nominal an element of Dw .
Deﬁnition 2. Let M = (W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ) be an IHL-Kripke model, w ∈ W , g be a
w-assignment, d ∈ Dw and F be a formula, the relation M, g,w,d  F is inductively deﬁned on the structure of F as
follows:
– M, g,w,d  p iff d ∈ Vw(p);
– M, g,w,d  a iff g(a) ∼w d;
– M, g,w,d ⊥ never;
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– M, g,w,d  A ∨ B iff M, g,w,d  A or M, g,w,d  B;
– M, g,w,d  A ⊃ B iff for all v  w , if M, g, v,d  A then M, g, v,d  B;
– M, g,w,d A iff for all v  w , d′ ∈ Dv , if Rv (d,d′) then M, g, v,d′  A;
– M, g,w,d ♦A iff there exists d′ ∈ Dw s.t. Rw(d,d′) and M, g,w,d′  A;
– M, g,w,d  a : A iff M, g,w, g(a)  A.
Let M = (W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ) be an IHL-Kripke model, a formula A is valid in M, denoted
M  A, if and only if M, g,w,d  A for every w ∈ W , every w-assignment g and every d ∈ Dw . A formula is valid in IHL,
denoted IHL  A, if and only if M  A for every IHL-Kripke model M.
Moreover, for any formula A and any IHL-Kripke model M, we have M  A if and only if M  a : A where a /∈ Nom(A).
Therefore, there is no loss of generality by considering only satisfaction statements that are statements of the form a : A.
The IHL-Kripke models are different from the intuitionistic modal models by having for each world w an equivalence
relation ∼w on the set Dw of modal worlds. In order to illustrate this point let us consider the formula a : b ∨ a : ¬b.
Because of the lack of excluded middle law in an intuitionistic logic this formula cannot be valid in IHL. If we consider the
satisfaction relation with nominals in the classical hybrid logic, namely g,w,d  a : iff g(a) = d, then the formula is valid.
But if we consider an IHL-Kripke model M with two worlds w and w ′ and a w-assignment g such that w < w ′ , g(a) and
g(b) are not equivalent by ∼w and g(a) ∼w ′ g(b) then we have M, g,w, g(a)  a : b ∨ a : ¬b and thus M is a countermodel
of the formula. This illustrates the necessity to use an equivalence relation rather than the equality.
Proposition 1 (Monotonicity). If M, g,w,d  A and w  w ′ , then M, g,w ′,d  A.
Proof. By structural induction on A. 
Proposition 2 (Equivalence). If M, g,w,d  A and d ∼w d′ , then M, g,w,d′  A.
Proof. By structural induction on A. 
The ﬁrst results for IHL deal with some proof-theoretical aspects based the natural deduction system DNIHL [7] given
in Fig. 1. No other alternative calculi like sequent calculi have been proposed and the decidability of IHL is an open ques-
tion.
The main goal of this paper is to study this question and to present the ﬁrst proof of decidability for IHL through a
decision procedure based on a sequent calculus.
3. A sequent-style natural deduction system for IHL
In this section, we give a natural deduction system for IHL in a sequent-style that is obtained from the natural deduction
system DNIHL described in Fig. 1. Our main point here consists in deﬁning a new system in order to deal with validity
in IHL. It is a ﬁrst step towards the sequent calculus we propose for this logic.
Deﬁnition 3 (Sequent). A sequent is a structure of the form Γ  C where Γ is a possibly empty ﬁnite multiset of satisfaction
statements and C is a satisfaction statement.
In a standard way, a sequent Γ  C corresponds to the formula (∧Γ ) ⊃ C . We use the notation ∧Γ as a shorthand
for a1 : A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ak : Ak when Γ = a1 : A1, . . . ,ak : Ak . If Γ is empty, we identify ∧Γ with . We note M, g,w  Γ if
M, g,w,d 
∧
Γ for d ∈ Dw (the choice of d is not important because Γ contains only satisfaction statements).
Our natural deduction system DNSIHL is given in Fig. 2. In fact DNSIHL is nothing more than the natural deduction system
DNIHL with contexts. Let us note that, like in the system DNIHL , we use the formulas of the form a : ♦c to represent the
accessibility relation. We can easily see that M, g,w,d  a : ♦c if and only if R(g(a), g(c)).
Let us consider the formula F = a : ((A ∨ B ⊃ c : C) ⊃ (A ⊃ c : C)). A proof of this formula in DNSIHL is
[id]
a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C),a : A  a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C)
[id]
a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C),a : A  a : A
[∨1I ]a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C),a : A  a : (A ∨ B)
[⊃E ]
a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C),a : A  a : c : C
[⊃I ]
a : (A ∨ B ⊃ c : C)  a : (A ⊃ c : C)
[⊃I ]a : ((A ∨ B ⊃ c : C) ⊃ (A ⊃ c : C))
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a : A ∧ B [∧I ]
a : A ∧ B
a : A [∧
1
E ]
a : A ∧ B
a : B [∧
2
E ]
a : A
a : A ∨ B [∨
1
I ]
a : B
a : A ∨ B [∨
1
I ]
[a : A] [a : B]
. .
. .
a : A ∨ B C C
C
[∨E ]
[a : A]
.
.
a : B
a : A ⊃ B [⊃I ]
a : A ⊃ B a : A
a : B [⊃E ]
a : A
c : a : A [:I ]
c : a : A
a : A [:E ]
e : A a : ♦e
a : ♦A [♦I ]
[c : A][a : ♦c]
.
.
a : ♦A C
C
[♦∗E ]
[a : ♦c]
.
.
c : A
a :A [
∗∗
I ]
a :A a : ♦e
e : A [E ]
a : ⊥
C
[⊥E ] a : a [ref ]
a : c a : A
c : A [nom]
∗ c does not occur in a : ♦A, in C , or in any undischarged assumption other than the
speciﬁed occurrences of c : A and a : ♦c.
∗∗ c does not occur in a :A or in any undischarged assumption other than the speciﬁed
occurrences of a : ♦c.
Fig. 1. The natural deduction system DNIHL .
In order to illustrate the differences with the initial system DNIHL we also give the proof of F in DNIHL:
[a : A ∨ B ⊃ c : C]
[a : A]
[∨1I ]a : A ∨ B
[⊃E ]
c : C
[⊃I ]
a : A ⊃ c : C
[⊃I ]
a : ((A ∨ B ⊃ c : C) ⊃ (A ⊃ c : C))
Let us show now that our sequent-style natural deduction system DNSIHL is sound and complete.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). If a sequent S has a proof in DNSIHL then it is valid in IHL.
Proof. For every rule we suppose that its conclusion is not valid and prove that one of its premises is also not valid.
Here, we only show the case [I ]. Let S = Γ  a :A be a sequent that is not valid and let M = (W ,, {Dw}w∈W ,
{∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ) be a countermodel of S . Then, there exist w0 ∈ W and a w0-assignment g such that
M, g,w0  Γ and M, g,w0  a : A. Since M, g,w0  a : A, we know that there exist w1  w0 and d ∈ Dw1 such
that Rw1 (g(a),d) and M, g,w1,d  A. Let c be a nominal not in Nom(S), we deﬁne the w1-assignment g′ by g′(c) = d
and for any nominal b, different from c, g′(b) = g(b). By Proposition 1, M, g′,w1  Γ holds and as Rw1 (g(a),d) holds,
we have M, g′,w1  a : ♦c. As we have M, g,w1,d  A and M, g,w1  c : A we deduce that M is a countermodel of
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A. 
Theorem 2 (Completeness). If a sequent S is valid in IHL then it has a proof in DNSIHL .
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 a : a [ref ] Γ,a : A  a : A [id]
Γ  a : ⊥
Γ  C [⊥E ]
Γ  a : c Γ  a : A
Γ  c : A [nom]
Γ  a : A Γ  a : B
Γ  a : A ∧ B [∧I ]
Γ  a : A ∧ B
Γ  a : A [∧
1
E ]
Γ  a : A ∧ B
Γ  a : B [∧
2
E ]
Γ  a : A
Γ  a : A ∨ B [∨
1
I ]
Γ  a : B
Γ  a : A ∨ B [∨
1
I ]
Γ  a : A ∨ B Γ,a : A  C Γ,a : B  C
Γ  C [∨E ]
Γ,a : A  a : B
Γ  a : A ⊃ B [⊃I ]
Γ  a : A ⊃ B Γ  a : A
Γ  a : B [⊃E ]
Γ  a : A
Γ  c : a : A [:I ]
Γ  c : a : A
Γ  a : A [:E ]
Γ  c : A Γ  a : ♦c
Γ  a : ♦A [♦I ]
Γ  a : ♦A Γ,a : ♦c, c : A  C
Γ  C [♦
∗
E ]
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A
Γ  a :A [
∗∗
I ]
Γ  a :A Γ  a : ♦c
Γ  c : A [E ]
∗ c does not occur in a : ♦A, in C or in any assumption in Γ .
∗∗ c does not occur in a :A or in any assumption in Γ .
Fig. 2. The natural deduction system DNSIHL .
Proof. Completeness is obtained from the system DNIHL by using the approach of [18]. Intuitively, the open assumptions in
a derivation tree in DNIHL are represented in the left-hand side of the corresponding sequent. We see that if we deﬁne a
natural deduction system similar to DNSIHL where we only replace the discharge of only one assumption with the discharge
of all the assumptions of the same form (complete discharge convention), then we obtain a system equivalent to DNIHL . For
example the rule [⊃I ] becomes
Γ,a : A  a : B
Γ ′  a : A ⊃ B [⊃I ]
where Γ ′ = Γ \ {a : A} (there is no occurrence of a : A in Γ ′). Then in order to prove the completeness of DNSIHL , we only
have to show that if a sequent has a derivation in the previous system then it has a derivation in DNSIHL . 
4. Sequent calculi for IHL
In this section, we propose two sequent calculi for IHL. The main one is called GIHL and we prove its soundness and
completeness by showing that a sequent is derivable in GIHL if and only if it is derivable in DNSIHL . Moreover we show
that this calculus has the cut-elimination property and that we can derive another sequent calculus, called G2IHL , without
equivalence conditions like in the ﬁrst one.
4.1. The sequent calculus GIHL
We observe that even if there exist works on the design of sequent calculi in some classical hybrid logics [16] we
cannot follow a similar approach in the case of the intuitionistic IHL logic. In our work we consider a sequent structure
that contains only satisfaction statements because it easily allows us to absorb the structural rules in the axioms, logical
and modal rules. Moreover, as in [7] the premises and the conclusion of each rule are satisfaction statements, we can relate
our calculi construction with the initial systems provided for IHL. We observe that it facilitates the study of relationships
between the cut-elimination and the normalization like in the case of intuitionistic logic [18]. Let us recall that a proof of
normalization for DNIHL is given in [7].
The principal formula of a rule application is deﬁned to be any formula which is introduced by that rule except the cases
of [⊃L] and [L] where the principal formulas are respectively a : A ⊃ B and a :A.
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∗](a ∼ a′)
Γ,a : ⊥  C [⊥] Γ  a′ : a [ref ](a ∼ a
′)
Γ,a : A,a : B  C
Γ,a : A ∧ B  C [∧L ]
Γ  a : A Γ  a : B
Γ  a : A ∧ B [∧R ]
Γ  a : A
Γ  a : A ∨ B [∨R1 ]
Γ  a : B
Γ  a : A ∨ B [∨R2 ]
Γ,a : A  C Γ,a : B  C
Γ,a : A ∨ B  C [∨L]
Γ,a : A ⊃ B  a : A Γ,a : B  C
Γ,a : A ⊃ B  C [⊃L]
Γ,a : A  a : B
Γ  a : A ⊃ B [⊃R ]
Γ,a : A  C
Γ, c : a : A  C [:L]
Γ  a : A
Γ  c : a : A [:R ]
Γ,a′ : ♦c,a :A, c : A  C
Γ,a′ : ♦c,a :A  C [L](a ∼ a
′)
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A
Γ  a :A [
∗∗∗
R ]
Γ,a : ♦c, c : A  C
Γ,a : ♦A  C [♦
∗∗
L ]
Γ,a′ : ♦c  c : A
Γ,a′ : ♦c  a : ♦A [♦R ](a ∼ a
′)
Γ  a : A Γ,a : A  C
Γ  C [cut]
∗ p is atomic.
∗∗ c does not occur in Γ,a : ♦A  C and A /∈ Nom.
∗∗∗ c does not occur in Γ  a :A.
Fig. 3. The sequent calculus GIHL .
We call derivation of a sequent S in GIHL any tree labelled with sequents such that the root node is labelled with S and
the labels at the immediate successors of a node n are the premises of a rule of GIHL having the label at n as conclusion.
A sequent S has a proof in GIHL , denoted GIHL S , if and only if S has a ﬁnite derivation in GIHL where any leaf node is
labelled with an axiom. Moreover we write nGIHL S if S has a proof in GIHL of depth smaller or equal to n.
Let S = Γ  C be a sequent and R be the relation on Nom(S) deﬁned by: aRb if and only if a : b is an element of Γ . We
note ∼ the reﬂexive, transitive, symmetric closure of R . When we associate a condition of the form a ∼ b to a rule, this
means that ∼ is the reﬂexive, transitive, symmetric closure of the relation obtained from the conclusion of this rule. It is
easy to see that the problem of checking conditions of this form is decidable.
The rules and axioms of GIHL are given in Fig. 3. Our approach is similar to the one used in the context of intuitionistic
logic that leads to the calculus G3i from the calculus LJ by absorbing weakening and contraction into the axioms and the
logical rules (see [18]). There are conditions of the form a ∼ b associated to some axioms and rules of GIHL that are due to
the absorption of the rules [nom] of DNSIHL .
We illustrate the use of GIHL by giving a proof of a :(b ⊃ c)  a : ♦b ⊃ ♦c
[ref ]
a :(b ⊃ c),b : (b ⊃ c),a : ♦b  b : b [ref ]a :(b ⊃ c),a : ♦b,d : b,b : c  b : c
[⊃L]
a :(b ⊃ c),b : (b ⊃ c),a : ♦b  b : c
[♦R ]
a :(b ⊃ c),b : (b ⊃ c),a : ♦b  a : ♦c
[L]
a :(b ⊃ c),a : ♦b  a : ♦c
[⊃R ]
a :(b ⊃ c)  a : ♦b ⊃ ♦c
Let us note that GIHL is sound and complete without the restriction on [id] that the principal formula must be atomic. How-
ever, without this restriction, GIHL fails some properties necessary in our approach to prove the cut-elimination property.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). If a sequent S has a proof in GIHL then it has a proof in DNSIHL .
Proof. By induction on the structure of the proof of S in GIHL . 
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Proof. By induction on the structure of the proof of S in DNSIHL . 
We show now that GIHL has the cut-elimination, namely if a sequent S is provable in GIHL then there exists a proof of
S in GIHL without [cut].
4.2. Cut-elimination in GIHL
The cut-elimination is one of the most important property of a sequent calculus and it generally results in the
(quasi-)subformula property: in any proof of a sequent S , only the (quasi-)subformulas of the formulas of S appear in this
proof.
Let us recall the notion of depth-preserving admissibility.
A rule [R] is said to be admissible for a calculus C , iff for all instances H1 . . . Hk
C
[R] of [R], if for all i ∈ [1,k] C Hi ,
then CC .
A rule [R] is said to be depth-preserving admissible for C , iff for all n, if for all i ∈ [1,k] nC Hi , then nCC .
Before to prove the cut-elimination property we show the depth-preserving admissibility properties of weakening and
contraction in G−IHL that is the sequent calculus GIHL without [cut]. We can also show the corresponding size-preserving
admissibility properties.
Proposition 3 (Weakening). If nG−IHLΓ  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : A  C.
Proof. Let D be a proof of Γ  C in G−IHL . By adding the formula a : A to each sequent context in D, we obtain a proof of
Γ,a : A  C that has the same depth. 
The following proposition is used to prove the depth-preserving admissibility of contraction. It is similar to the inversion
lemma given in [18], knowing that for some rules of G−IHL , if the conclusion has a proof of a depth n then some of its
premises has a proof of a depth smaller or equal to n.
Proposition 4 (Inversion lemma).
1. If nG−IHLΓ,a : A ∧ B  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : A,a : B  C.
2. If nG−IHLΓ,a : A1 ∨ A2  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : Ai  C, for i = 1,2.
3. If nG−IHLΓ  a : A1 ∧ A2 then 
n
G−IHL
Γ  a : Ai , for i = 1,2.
4. If nG−IHLΓ  a : A ⊃ B then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : A  a : B.
5. If nG−IHLΓ,a : A ⊃ B  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : B  C.
6. If nG−IHLΓ, c : a : A  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : A  C.
7. If nG−IHLΓ  c : a : A then 
n
G−IHL
Γ  a : A.
8. If nG−IHLΓ  a :A then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A (c /∈ Nom(Γ  a :A)).
9. If nG−IHLΓ,a : ♦A  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : ♦c, c : A  C (c /∈ Nom(Γ,a : ♦A  C)).
Proof. By induction on n. Here we only develop the case of 8.
– If n = 0 then Γ  a :A is an axiom instance. Thus there is a formula of the form d : ⊥ in Γ and 0G−IHLΓ,a : ♦c  c : A
holds.
– Let us assume that n+1G−IHLΓ  a :A by a derivation D. If a :A is not principal in the last rule applied in D, then by
applying induction hypothesis to the premise(s) and using the same rule we have n+1G−IHLΓ,a : ♦c  c : A.
Otherwise, a :A is principal and D ends with
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A
Γ  a :A [

R ]
By taking the immediate subdeduction of the premise we have n+1− Γ,a : ♦c  c : A. GIHL
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G−IHL of a depth n then the sequent obtained from S by renaming some nominals has a proof in G−IHL of a depth smaller or
equal to n.
Deﬁnition 4. A renaming function f is a function from N to M where N,M ⊂ Nom. It is inductively extended to the
formulas having nominals in N as follows:
– f (p) = p where p ∈ Prop ∪ {⊥};
– f (A ⊗ B) = f (A) ⊗ f (B) where ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃};
– f (A) = f (A) where  ∈ {,♦};
– f (a : A) = f (a) : f (A).
We use the notation f (Γ ) for f (a1 : A1), . . . , f (ak : Ak) when Γ = a1 : A1, . . . ,ak : Ak . Moreover, the notation f (Γ  C)
corresponds to f (Γ )  f (C).
Proposition 5 (Renaming). Let S be a sequent and f : Nom(S) → M be a renaming function. If nG−IHL S then 
n
G−IHL
f (S).
Proof. It is suﬃcient to prove by induction on n that if nG−IHL S then 
n
G−IHL
S[c/a] for any c and a of Nom, where S[c/a]
denotes the renaming of a by c in S . 
The next propositions correspond to the depth-preserving admissibility of contraction.
Proposition 6 (Contraction). If nG−IHLΓ,a : A,a : A  C then 
n
G−IHL
Γ,a : A  C.
Proof. By induction on n.
– If n = 0 then Γ,a : A,a : A  C is an instance of an axiom. Thus, it is easy to see that Γ,a : A  C is also an instance of
the same axiom.
– Let us assume that n+1G−IHLΓ,a : A,a : A  C by a derivation D. If the last rule applied in D does not modify the two
occurrences of a : A then by induction hypothesis on the premise(s) and using the same rule, we have n+1G−IHLΓ,a : A  C .
Otherwise we have to distinguish the cases of this last rule. Here, we only develop the case of [♦L] (A ≡ ♦B):
Γ,a : ♦B,a : ♦c, c : B  C
Γ,a : ♦B,a : ♦B  C [♦L]
By Proposition 4 we have nG−IHLΓ,a : ♦c,a : ♦c
′, c : B, c′ : B  C . Then by Proposition 5, nG−IHLΓ,a : ♦c,a : ♦c, c : B, c : B  C
holds (c and c′ are new nominals).
Finally by induction hypothesis applied twice we have nG−IHLΓ,a : ♦c, c : B  C and then 
n+1
G−IHL
Γ,a : ♦B  C is obtained
using [♦L]. 
Now, we give a proposition stronger than the depth-preserving admissibility of contraction. However, it does not cover
all satisfaction statements. This proposition is useful for the proof of cut-elimination.
Proposition 7. If nG−IHLΓ,a : A,a
′ : A  C and a ∼ a′ in Γ,a : A  C, then nG−IHLΓ,a : A  C.
Proof. By induction on n, similarly to the proof of Proposition 6. 
The two following propositions are used in the proof of cut-elimination.
Proposition 8. Let Γ  C be a sequent and a,a′ ∈ Nom(Γ  C) such that a ∼ a′ . If nG−IHLΓ,a
′ : a  C then nG−IHLΓ  C.
Proof. By induction on n. 
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′ , then nG−IHLΓ  a
′ : A.
Proof. By induction on n. 
Let D be a proof of Γ  C , we denote D[Γ ′] the proof of Γ,Γ ′  C obtained from D by applying depth-preserving
admissibility of weakening.
Theorem 5 (Cut-elimination). If a sequent S has a proof in GIHL then it has a proof without [cut].
Proof. To prove the cut-elimination property, we use a variant of Gentzen’s original proof of this property for classical
and intuitionistic logic [18]. This proof consists in transforming the applications of cut rules to applications of cut rules on
smaller formulae or applications of less heights. It suﬃces to assume that G−IHLΓ  a : A and G−IHLΓ,a : A  C and to prove
that G−IHLΓ  C by induction on the structure of A and on the cut depth. Let D1 be a proof of Γ  a : A in G
−
IHL of depth n1
and D2 be a proof of Γ,a : A  C in G−IHL of depth n2, there are four main cases to consider:
1. Γ  a : A is an instance of an axiom;
2. Γ,a : A  C is an instance of an axiom;
3. Γ  a : A and Γ,a : A  C are not axiom instances and a : A is not principal in the last rule of D1 or D2;
4. a : A is principal for both last rules of D1 and D2.
Case 1. Γ  a : A is an axiom instance.
1(a). If Γ a : A is an instance of [id], then it is of the form Γ ′,a′ : pa : p and Γ,a : A  C is of the form Γ ′,a′ : p,a : p C
where a ∼ a′ in all these sequents. By Proposition 7, we have if nG−IHLΓ,a
′ : p,a : p  C with a ∼ a′ , then nG−IHLΓ,a
′ : p  C .
Thus we obtain n2G−IHLΓ,a
′ : p  C .
1(b). If Γ  a : A is an instance of [⊥], then it is of the form Γ ′,a′ : ⊥  a : A. Thus, Γ  C is of the form Γ ′,a′ : ⊥  C and
it is an instance of [⊥].
1(c). If Γ  a : A is an instance of [ref ], then it is of the form Γ  a : a′ and Γ,a : A  C is of the form Γ,a : a′  C where
a ∼ a′ in these sequents. Using Proposition 8, we obtain G−IHLΓ  C .
Case 2. Γ,a : A  C is an axiom instance.
2(a). If Γ,a : A  C is an instance of [id]. If it is of the form Γ,a : p  a′ : p, then Γ  a : A is of the form Γ  a : p with
a ∼ a′ . Using Proposition 9, we deduce that G−IHLΓ  a′ : p. Now, we study the case when Γ,a : A  C is of the form
Γ,a : A,a′ : p a′′ : p with a′ ∼ a′′ . If a′ ∼ a′′ in Γ  C , then G−IHLΓ  C holds. Otherwise, a : A is of the form a : c. If Γ  a : c
is an axiom instance, then it is of the form Γ ′,d : ⊥  a : c and we deduce that Γ  C is an instance of [⊥]. Now we
distinguish the cases where the last rule applied in D1 is [⊃L] or not. If the last rule applied in D1 is [⊃L] then it is of the
form:
D′1
Γ  e : B
D′′1
Γ ′, e : D  a : c
[⊃L]
Γ ′, e : B ⊃ D  a : c
Since Γ,a : cC is an instance of [id], we can easily see that Γ ′, e : D,a : cC is also an instance of [id]. Using the induction
hypothesis, we obtain a proof of Γ  C as follows:
D′1
Γ  e : B
D′′1
Γ ′, e : D  a : c [id]Γ ′, e : D,a : c  C
[cut]
Γ ′, e : D  C
[⊃L]
Γ  C
with [cut] that corresponds to the application of the induction hypothesis.
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rule (the case of one-premise rule being simpler):
D′1
Γ ′  a : c
D′′1
Γ ′′  a : c
[R]
Γ  a : c
It is easy to see that Γ ′,a : c  C and Γ ′′,a : c  C are instances of [id]. By applying the induction hypothesis, we obtain a
proof of Γ  C as follows:
D′1
Γ ′  a : c [id]Γ ′,a : c  C
[cut]
Γ ′  C
D′′1
Γ ′′  a : c [id]Γ ′′,a : c  C
[cut]
Γ ′′  C
[R]
Γ  C
2(b)–2(c). The subcases where Γ,a : A  C is an instance of [ref ] or [⊥] are similar to the subcase 2(a).
Case 3. Γ  a : A and Γ,a : A  C are not axiom instances and a : A is not principal in the last rule of D1 or D2.
3(a). Γ  a : A and Γ,a : A  C are not axiom instances and a : A is not principal in the last rule of D1. We consider only
the case where the last rule of D1 is a two-premises rule:
D′1
Γ ′  C ′
D′′1
Γ ′′  a : A
[R]
Γ  a : A
If [R] = [⊃L] then C ′ ≡ a : A holds. By applying the induction hypothesis and the depth-preserving admissibility of weaken-
ing and contraction (Proposition 3 and Proposition 6), we obtain a proof of Γ  C as follows:
D′1[Γ ]
Γ,Γ ′  a : A
D2[Γ ′]
Γ,Γ ′,a : A  C
[cut]
Γ,Γ ′  C
D′′1[Γ ]
Γ,Γ ′′  a : A
D2[Γ ′′]
Γ,Γ ′′,a : A  C
[cut]
Γ,Γ ′′  C
[R]
Γ,Γ  C
If [R] = [⊃L] then a proof of Γ  C is obtained similarly by applying the induction hypothesis and the depth-preserving
admissibility of weakening and contraction as follows:
D′1[Γ ]
Γ,Γ ′  C ′
D′′1[Γ ]
Γ,Γ ′′  a : A
D2[Γ ′′]
Γ,Γ ′′,a : A  C
[cut]
Γ,Γ ′′  C
[⊃L]
Γ,Γ  C
3(b). Γ  a : A and Γ,a : A  C are not axiom instances and a : A is not principal in the last rule of D2. The proof in this
case is similar to case 3(a).
Case 4. a : A is principal of the both last rules of D1 and D2. Here, we only develop the case of A ≡B . The other cases
are similar.
Γ  a : A and Γ,a : A  C are respectively of the form Γ ′,a′ : ♦c′  a :B and Γ ′,a :B,a′ : ♦c′  C with a ∼ a′ in these
sequents and then D1 and D2 are respectively of the form:
D′1
Γ ′,a : ♦c,a′ : ♦c′  c : B
[R ]
Γ ′,a′ : ♦c′  a :B and
D′2
Γ ′,a :B,a′ : ♦c′, c′ : B  C
[L]
Γ ′,a :B,a′ : ♦c′  C
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 C is obtained by using
Proposition 3 and the induction hypothesis as follows:
Γ ′,a′ : ♦c′  c′ : B
D1[c′ : B]
Γ,a′ : ♦c′, c′ : B  a :B
D′2
Γ ′,a :B,a′ : ♦c′, c′ : B  C
[cut]
Γ,a′ : ♦c′, c′ : B  C
[cut]
Γ,a′ : ♦c′  C 
4.3. Another sequent calculus G2IHL
Now we show that it is possible to deﬁne another sequent calculus for IHL without conditions of the form a ∼ b. We call
G2IHL the calculus obtained from GIHL by adding the following structural rule:
Γ [a/c]  C[a/c]
Γ, c : a  C [S]
and by replacing [id], [ref ], [L] and [♦R ] by the following new rules:
Γ,a : A  a : A [id
′]
Γ  a : a [ref
′]
Γ,a : ♦c,a :A, c : A  C
Γ,a : ♦c,a :A  C [
′
L]
Γ,a : ♦c  c : A
Γ,a : ♦c  a : ♦A [♦
′
R ]
Theorem 6. The sequent calculus G2IHL is sound and complete.
Proof. We show that a sequent is derivable in G2IHL if and only if it is derivable in GIHL . 
5. Decidability of IHL
In this section, we prove the decidability of IHL by using the sequent calculus G−IHL . The key point of our decision
procedure is the use of the cut-elimination property in order to provide a suitable subformula property different from the
usual one, called the quasi-subformula property.
We introduce a notion of redundancy satisfying the fact that any sequent valid in IHL has an irredundant proof. Then we
prove that there is no inﬁnite derivation which is not irredundant and deduce the decidability result.
5.1. Introduction of new nominals
In order to prove the decidability of IHL by using G−IHL , we must solve the problem of the introduction of new nominals
using [♦L] and [R ]. This problem is similar to the one of the introduction of new labels in the labelled sequent calculi
of the intuitionistic modal logics studied by Simpson in [17]. Let us note that the introduction of new nominals or labels
is not a problem in the case of classical modal and hybrid logics because we can deﬁne proof systems with only invertible
rules allowing terminating proof-search [5,15].
In the case of Simpson’s calculi, the problem of the introduction of new labels was resolved using the following property:
for any derivation, there is a positive integer n such that there is no sequent containing a chain of length greater than n. A chain is a
sequence of the form x0Rx1, . . . , xm−1Rxm where R represents the accessibility relation, x0 is not a new label and xi+1 is a new label
for i ∈ [0,m− 1].
We can say that any inﬁnite derivation is redundant because there are necessarily two sequents where one can be
obtained from the other by renaming some new nominals (for more details see [17]). Similarly, for GIHL a chain is a
sequence of the form a0 : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2, . . . ,am−1 : ♦am where a0 is not a new nominal and ai+1 is a new nominal for
i ∈ [0,m− 1].
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.
a0 : ♦a1, . . . ,ai : ♦ai+1,a1 : a0, . . . ,ai : a0,a2 : p, . . . ,ai+1 : p,a0 :(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥
.
.
.
a0♦a1,a1 : ♦a2,a2 : ♦a3,a1 : a0,a2 : a0,a2 : p,a3 : p,a0 :(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [♦L]
a0 : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2,a1 : a0,a2 : a0,a2 : p,a2 : ♦p,a0 :(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [∧L]
a0 : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2,a1 : a0,a2 : p,a2 : a0 ∧ ♦p,a0(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [L]
a0♦a1,a1♦a2,a1 : a0,a2 : p,a0(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [♦L]
a0 : ♦a1,a1 : a0,a1 : ♦p,a0(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [∧L]
a0 : ♦a1,a1 : a0 ∧ ♦p,a0 :(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥ [L]
a0 : ♦a1,a0 :(a0 ∧ ♦p)  a0 : ⊥
Moreover, it is easy to see that, in this inﬁnite derivation, there are no two distinct sequents such that one can be obtained
from the other by renaming some new nominals. To solve this problem, we associate to every sequent S appearing in a
given derivation a particular sequent, called the equivalid sequent of S , satisfying the previous property and the fact that a
sequent has a proof if and only if its equivalid sequent has a proof of the same size. The equivalid sequents are obtained by
renaming some new nominals.
5.2. Quasi-subformula property
Let us recall that the subformulas of a formula A are inductively deﬁned as follows:
– A is a subformula of A;
– if B ⊗ C is a subformula of A then so are B ,C , for ⊗ = ∧,∨,⊃;
– if B is a subformula of A the so is B , for =,♦;
– if a : B is a subformula of A then so is B .
Now, we introduce the notion of quasi-subformula. It is similar to the weak subformula notion introduced in [15] and the
quasi-subformula notion given in [7].
Deﬁnition 5 (Quasi-subformula). Let A be a formula, the quasi-subformulas of A are inductively deﬁned as follows:
– for every ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃}, the quasi-subformulas of a : A⊗ B are a : A⊗ B and all the quasi-subformulas of a : A and a : B;
– the quasi-subformulas of a :A for  ∈ {♦,} are a :A and all the quasi-subformulas of c : A for an arbitrary c.
Theorem 7 (Quasi-subformula property). Let S be a sequent and D be a derivation of S in G−IHL . Any formula occurrence a : A in D is
either a quasi-subformula of a formula in S or of the form a : ♦c.
Proof. By induction on the depth of D. We only have to distinguish the cases of the last rule application. 
We are interested in the size of derivations. Previously, we proved that weakening and contraction are depth-preserving
admissible for G−IHL . Weakening and contraction are also size-preserving admissible for G
−
IHL . Moreover, if a sequent S has
a proof in G−IHL of size n, then any sequent obtained from S by renaming some nominals with others has a proof of size
smaller or equal to n.
Proposition 10. If Γ  C has a proof in G−IHL of size n, then Γ,a : A  C has a proof of size smaller or equal to n.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proposition 11. If Γ,a : A,a : A  C has a proof in G−IHL of size n, then Γ,a : A  C has a proof of size smaller or equal to n.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 6. 
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 C has a proof in G−IHL of size n, then
f (Γ  C) has a proof of size smaller or equal to n.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5. 
Let S ′ be a sequent appearing in a given derivation of the sequent S , ∼ be the associated equivalence relation of S ′ and
let c be an element of Nom(S ′) such that c /∈ Nom(S). We denote N(c, S ′) the set of nominals deﬁned by a ∈ N(c, S ′) if and
only if a ∈ Nom(S) and a ∼ c.
Deﬁnition 6. Let S ′ be a sequent appearing in a given derivation of a sequent S and N = Nom(S) with an order ﬁxed on
the elements of N . We deﬁne Eq(S ′) as the sequent f (S ′) where f is a renaming function deﬁned as follows
f (c) =
{
c if either c ∈ N or N(c, S ′) = ∅,
c′ otherwise, with c′ = max(N(c, S ′))
where max denotes the maximum.
We can see that any formula of Eq(S ′) is a quasi-subformula of a formula of S or of the form a : ♦c. This comes from
the quasi-subformula property.
Proposition 13. Let S ′ be a sequent appearing in a given derivation. S ′ has a proof in G−IHL of size n if and only if Eq(S ′) has a proof
of size n.
Proof. We only have to prove that for any sequent S and for all a,b ∈ Nom(S) such that a ∼ b, S has a proof in G−IHL of
size n if and only if S[a/b] has a proof in G−IHL of size n. The if part is proved by induction on n. The only if part comes from
Proposition 12. 
5.3. N-chains
Now, we introduce the notion of N-chain. Intuitively, the N-chains correspond to sequences of formulas of the form
a : ♦c which will allow us to give a description of the arrangement of the new nominals introduced using the rules [R ]
and [♦L]. The key point is that the length of these sequences, in any sequent equivalid to a sequent appearing in any
derivation of S in G−IHL , is bounded by the nesting degree of S .
The nesting degree of a formula A, denoted nest(A), is inductively deﬁned as follows:
– nest(p) = 0; nest(a) = 0; nest(⊥) = 0;
– nest(A ⊗ B) =max(nest(A),nest(B)) where ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃};
– nest(a : A) = nest(A);
– nest(A) = 1+ nest(A) where  ∈ {,♦}.
The nesting degree of a sequent is the maximum of the nesting degrees of its formulas.
Deﬁnition 7 (N-chain). Let S = Γ  C be a sequent and N a ﬁnite set of nominals. An N-chain is a sequence of the form
a0 : ♦a1,a1 : ♦a2, . . .ak−1 :,♦ak (a0 when k = 0) where
– ai−1 : ♦ai ∈ Γ for i = 1, . . . ,k;
– a0 ∈ N;
– ai /∈ N for i = 1, . . . ,k − 1;
– if ak ∈ N and k = 0 then k > 1; and
– if ak /∈ N then there is no nominal a such that ak : ♦a ∈ Γ .
Proposition 14. Let S and S ′ be two sequents such that S ′ is the equivalid sequent of a sequent appears in a derivation of S . Then,
for all a : ♦b ∈ Γ (S ′ = Γ  C) such that either a /∈ Nom(S) or b /∈ Nom(S), a : ♦b belongs to a Nom(S)-chain of S ′ .
Moreover, the length of any Nom(S)-chain in S ′ is smaller or equal to nest(S) + 1.
Proof. The ﬁrst property is obtained from the rules that introduce new nominals, namely [L] and [♦R ], and also from
the deﬁnition of the equivalid sequents where only some nominals introduced using the previous two rules are renamed by
nominals in Nom(S).
The second property holds because if there exists a Nom(S)-chain with a length greater than nest(S) in S ′ then there
is a nominal b /∈ Nom(S) in this Nom(S)-chain and another nominal a ∈ Nom(S) such that a ∼ b and b is renamed by a in
order to build Eq(S ′) (from the deﬁnition of the rules [L] and [♦R ]). 
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only if there exists a renaming function f such that set( f (Γ1)) ⊆ set(Γ2) and f (C1) = C2 where Eq(S1) = Γ1  C1 and
Eq(S2) = Γ2  C2.
We use set(Γ ) to denote the set underlying the multiset Γ (the set of the formulas of Γ ). Moreover, we us the notation
set(Γ  C) for set(Γ )  C .
Proposition 15. Let S1 and S2 be two sequents in a derivation of S . If S1 S S2 then if S1 has a proof of size n then S2 has a proof
of size smaller or equal to n.
Proof. From the size-preserving admissibility of weakening and contraction (see Proposition 10 and Proposition 11) and
also Proposition 12. 
5.4. Trees and skeletons
Now, we use the notion of N-chain to represent the equivalid sequents by sets of trees. Then we derive from such
trees other trees called skeletons. Next, we prove that the numbers of nodes of the skeletons obtained from the equivalid
sequents of the sequents in a given derivation are bounded. Using this property, we show that for any derivation of S
having an inﬁnite branch, there are two sequents S ′ and S ′′ , with S ′ strictly occurring above S ′′ in this branch, and such
that S ′ S S ′′ .
Deﬁnition 8 (Tree). Let S and S ′ = Γ  c : C be two sequents such that S ′ is the equivalid sequent of a sequent in a
derivation of S and a be an element of Nom(S). We deﬁne the tree associated to a in S ′ , denoted T (a, S ′), as follows:
– The nodes are labelled with triples (b,Γ (b),α(b)) where b ∈ Nom(S ′), Γ (b) = {A | b : A ∈ Γ } and
α(b) =
{
C if b = c,
 otherwise
where  is a symbol not in Nom and Prop.
– The root node is labelled with (a,Γ (a),α(a)).
– A node labelled with (b′,′,α′) is an immediate successor of a node labelled with (b,,α) iff b : ♦b′ belongs to a
Nom(S)-chain of S ′ starting with a.
Let S ′ be the sequent a : p, c1 : q, c2 : q,b : q,a : ♦c1,a : ♦c2, c1 : ♦b, c2 : ♦b  b : p which is an equivalid sequent of a
sequent appearing in a derivation of S such that Nom(S) = {a,b}. T (a, S ′) is the following tree:
We characterize every sequent S ′ = Γ  C which is equivalid to a sequent appearing in a derivation of S by the set of
trees TS ′ = {T (a, S ′) | a ∈ Nom(S)}. It is called the tree set characterizing S ′ . From this set we can easily obtain the value of
set(Γ  C).
We write ∼=N , with N is a ﬁnite set of nominals, the equivalence relation on the trees deﬁned by T1 ∼=N T2 if and only
if T1 = f1(T2) and T2 = f2(T1) where f1 and f2 are two renaming functions satisfying the property that for all a ∈ N we
have f1(a) = f2(a) = a, i.e., two trees are equivalent if and only if each tree can be obtained from the other by renaming
some nominals which is not in N .
Let us note that any tree can be represented by the expression (r, L) where r is the root node and L is a list of trees.
The set of the subtrees of a tree T is inductively deﬁned as follows: T is a subtree of T ; if (r, L) is a subtree of T then so
are the elements of L. We note dep(T ) the depth of the tree T .
Deﬁnition 9 (Skeleton). Let S and S ′ be two sequents such that S ′ is the equivalid sequent of a sequent in a derivation of
S , T be an element of the tree set characterizing S ′ and N = Nom(S).
A skeleton of T , denoted Sk(T ), is a tree built from T in a following way:
– Step 0: we initialize Sk(T ) with T .
– Step i + 1: for all subtrees ST = (r, L) of Sk(T ) of depth equal to (i + 1), we replace ST in Sk(T ) by (r, L′) where L′ is
a sublist of L obtained as follows:
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– for all T0 ∈ L, if there is no tree T1 in L′ such that T0 ∼=N T1, then we add T ′ to L′ .
A skeleton of the tree given in the previous example is:
We can see that there is not always a single skeleton associated to a tree. However, all the skeletons associated to any
tree are equivalent. If {T1, . . . , Tk} is the tree set characterizing S = Γ  C and S ′ = Γ ′  C is the sequent obtained from
{Sk(T1), . . . , Sk(Tk)} then Γ ′ ⊆ Γ and set(S ′) can be obtained from set(S) by renaming some new nominals.
Proposition 16. Let S be a sequent and D be a derivation of S . Then there exists a constant K such that for any sequent S ′ equivalid
to a sequent appearing in D, if T is in the tree set characterizing S ′ then the number of nodes of Sk(T ) is smaller or equal to K .
Proof. We know that the depth of T is equal to the depth of T ′ = Sk(T ) and is smaller or equal to nest(S) + 1 (Proposi-
tion 14). Let Φ be the set of the subformulas of the formulas of S and φ its size. The size of the set of the subsets of Φ
is 2φ . Using the quasi-subformula property (Theorem 7), we prove that for all n a node of T ′ of depth dep(T ′)− 1, n has at
most K1 = (N + 1) × 2φ × 2 successors where N is the size of Nom(S).
Similarly, the number of the successors of any node in T of depth dep(T ′)−2 is at most equal to K2 = (N+1)×2K1 ×2.
We continue until the root node (Kdep(T )). Thus, we can take the constant K equal to
1+
dep(T )−1∑
i=0
i∏
j=0
Kdep(T )− j 
Proposition 17. Let S be a sequent and D be a derivation of S . The set of skeletons obtained from the equivalid sequents of the
sequents in D is partitioned into a ﬁnite set of equivalence classes by ∼=Nom(S) .
Proof. A consequence of Proposition 16. 
Proposition 18. LetD be a derivation of a sequent S with an inﬁnite branch B= (S1, S2, . . . , Sk, . . . ). Then, there exist i and j such
that i < j and S j S Si .
Proof. Let B′ = (S ′1, S ′2, . . . , S ′1, . . . ) where S ′i = Eq(Si) for i = 1,2, . . . . We associate to every sequent in B′ the set of
tree TS ′i = {Sk(T (a, S ′i )) | a ∈ Nom(S)}. Using Proposition 17, we deduce that there exist two sequents S ′i = Γ ′i  C ′i and
S ′j = Γ ′j  C ′j such that i < j and for all T j ∈ TS ′j , there is Ti ∈ TS ′i satisfying Ti ∼=Nom(S) T j . If Γ ′′i  C ′′i and Γ ′′j  C ′′j are
the two sequents obtained respectively from TS ′i and TS ′j , then there is a renaming function f such that f (Γ
′′
j ) = Γ ′′i and
f (C ′′j ) = C ′′i . Moreover, we have Γ ′′i ⊆ Γ ′i and C ′′i = C ′i . Since there is a renaming function g such that set(g(Γ ′j )) = Γ ′′j and
g(C ′j) = C ′′j , set(( f ◦ g)(Γ ′j )) ⊆ set(Γ ′i ) and ( f ◦ g)(C ′j) = C ′i hold. Therefore, we deduce that S j S Si . 
5.5. A decision procedure for IHL
Now we introduce a notion of redundancy on cut-free derivations in our calculus such that any sequent that is valid
has an irredundant proof. Then, by using the quasi-subformula property, we prove that there is no inﬁnite proof which is
redundant and then provide a decision procedure for IHL and then prove the decidability of this logic through proof-search
using our sequent calculus.
Deﬁnition 10. A derivation of S is redundant if it contains two sequents S ′ and S ′′ , with S ′ occurring strictly above S ′′ in
the same branch, such that S ′ S S ′ . A derivation is irredundant if it is not redundant.
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Proof. By induction on the size s of the proof of S .
If s = 1 then it is an irredundant proof.
Now, we assume that for any sequent, if it has a proof of size smaller or equal to n (n  1), then it has an irredundant
proof (the induction hypothesis).
Let D be a proof of S of size (n + 1). If D is irredundant then we have the result. Otherwise it has a branch containing
two sequents S1 and S2 such that S1 occurring above S2 and S1 S S2. Let n′ be the size of the subderivation of S1 in D.
It is easy to see that the size of the subderivation of S2 in D is strictly greater than n′ . Using Proposition 15, we know that
S2 has a proof D2 of size smaller or equal to n′ . So by replacing in D the subderivation of S2 with D2 we obtain a proof
of S of size smaller or equal to n. Therefore, by applying the induction hypothesis, we deduce that S has an irredundant
proof. 
Now, we provide a decision procedure for the sequents in IHL based on the redundancy notion similar to this proposed
in [17] for the intuitionistic modal logics. It consists of an exhaustive search for an irredundant derivation.
Let S be a sequent.
– Step 1: we start with the derivation containing only S which is the unique irredundant derivation of size 1. If this
derivation is a proof then we return it. Otherwise we move to the next step.
– Step i + 1: we build the set of all the irredundant derivations of size i + 1. If this set contains a proof of S then we
return it. Otherwise if this set is empty then the decision algorithm fails, else we move to the next step.
There are only a ﬁnite number of possible rule applications (the choice of the new nominals introduced by the rules
[R ] and [♦L] is not essential). Thus, the set of the irredundant derivations of size i + 1 is ﬁnite. Moreover, this set can be
built in a ﬁnite time because the S relation is decidable.
Theorem 8 (Decidability). The logic IHL is decidable.
Proof. Using Proposition 18, we know that there is no inﬁnite irredundant derivation. Thus, we deduce that our algorithm
terminates. Therefore, IHL is decidable. 
6. Conclusion
In this work, we provide the ﬁrst sequent calculus for the hybrid intuitionistic logic IHL [7] that is appropriate for proof-
search thanks to the absence of structural rules. After proving the main properties of this calculus that are soundness,
completeness and cut-elimination, we deﬁne a decision procedure and then we propose the ﬁrst proof of decidability of
this logic. The study of complexity of IHL [1] will be the next step developed in further works but we will also consider
extensions of our calculi with rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations (geometric theories) like
reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity, in order to obtain a system in which each condition on the accessibility relation has
a corresponding rule and each combination of these rules is complete for the logic with the corresponding conditions.
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